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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Don Edward Collom appeals from his conviction for lewd conduct with a
child.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Collom with one count of lewd conduct with a child
under the age of 16 for having oral-genital contact with a 15-year-old boy. (R.,
pp. 59-60.) The case proceeded to jury trial. (R., pp. 252-61.)
Prior to the start of presentation of evidence, Collom moved to exclude the
victim’s mother, Monica Winder, from the courtroom because she was a witness.
(Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 256, L. 19 – p. 257, L. 10.) The state responded that, because
the victim was a minor, immediate family members such as parents were
considered victims, and requested that the mother be allowed to be present at
the trial as the family representative. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 258, L. 6 – p. 259, L. 6.)
Collom’s trial attorney argued that the victim was old enough to attend trial and
therefore a family representative was unnecessary, and alternatively asked that
the court designate the victim’s father as the family representative. (Trial Tr., vol.
I, p. 259, Ls. 9-18.) After further colloquy with counsel, the district court allowed
the mother to be present in the courtroom as the family representative. (Trial Tr.,
vol. I, p. 259, L. 19 – p. 263, L. 25.)
At the conclusion of the trial the jury found Collom guilty. (R., p. 262.)
Shortly after the verdict, Collom moved for a new trial. (R., p. 266.) One
of the grounds raised in the motion was a claim, raised for the first time, that
1

defense witness E.O. had been intimidated by Monica Winder’s presence in the
courtroom.

(R., pp. 275-82.)

Other grounds asserted were claims of

prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument that had not been objected to at
trial. (R., pp. 282-88.)

The district court denied the motion because it failed to

articulate one of the statutory grounds for granting a new trial. (R., pp. 298-303.)
The district court entered judgment, imposing a sentence of 10 years with
three years determinate. (R., pp. 317-20.) Collom timely appealed from the
entry of judgment. (R., pp. 328-30.)
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ISSUES
Collom states the issues on appeal as:
A.

The trial court erred in refusing to grant Defendant’s motion
to exclude a person who intimidated a witness from the
courtroom, while the intimidated witness testified.

B.

The trial court failed to consider the constitutional rights of
Defendant, allowing the State to select a designee to be in
the courtroom, over Defendant’s objection, and failing to
analyze the need for a designee under Idaho Code § 195306(3).

C.

The State committed prosecutorial misconduct when the
Prosecutor disparaged Defense Counsel and Defense
Counsel’s credibility in trial and during closing arguments.

D.

The State committed prosecutorial misconduct when the
Prosecutor appealed to the emotion, passion or prejudice of
the jury through the use of inflammatory tactics by instructing
the jury to place themselves in the position of the victim.

E.

The cumulative errors in the trial were of such magnitude
they denied the Defendant his constitutional right to a fair
trial.

(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Collom failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when
it denied his pre-trial motion to exclude witnesses under I.R.E. 615 both
because the witness was the family representative of the victim and
because Collom failed to show the possibility of relevant prejudice?

2.

Has Collom, who does not challenge the district court’s holding that his
motion was not based on a statutory ground, failed to show error in the
denial of his motion for a new trial?

3.

Has Collom failed to show fundamental error in the prosecutor’s closing
arguments?

4.

Having failed to show error, has Collom failed to show cumulative error?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Collom Has Shown No Abuse Of Discretion In The Partial Denial Of His Pre-Trial
Motion To Exclude Witnesses Under I.R.E. 615
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Collom’s motion to exclude witnesses as

regarding witness Monica Winder, the child victim’s mother. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p.
256, L. 19 – p. 263, L. 25.) On appeal Collom asserts that the victim’s mother
was improperly allowed to remain under the victim’s rights statute. (Appellant’s
brief, pp. 9-10.) Review of the applicable law, however, shows no abuse of
discretion.

First, the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding Monica

Winder could remain as the representative of the family under the victim’s rights
statute. Second, Collom has never claimed or demonstrated a legal ground for
exclusion under I.R.E. 615.
B.

Standard Of Review
Both the decision of whether to grant or deny a request for witness

exclusion under I.R.E. 615 and the appropriate remedy for a breach of any such
order are discretionary decisions by the trial court. State v. Huntsman, 146 Idaho
580, 589, 199 P.3d 155, 164 (Ct. App. 2008).
C.

Collom Has Shown No Error In The District Court’s Ruling Under I.R.E.
615
Upon request or upon its own initiative “the court may order witnesses

excluded so they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses.” I.R.E. 615(a).
The rule does not apply to crime victims with a state constitutional right to be
4

present. Id. Furthermore, “the trial court ordinarily should not exclude witnesses
without a demonstration of probable prejudice.” Huntsman, 146 Idaho at 589,
199 P.3d at 164. Refusal to order a mistrial for disobedience of an exclusionary
order “will not justify reversal on appeal absent a showing of prejudice sufficient
to constitute an abuse of discretion.” Id. The prejudice at issue under I.R.E. 615
is the “possibility of witnesses shaping their testimony to conform to or rebut the
prior testimony of other witnesses.” Id.
Application of these legal standards shows no error by the trial court, first
because the witness at issue was a victim and therefore exempt from the
exclusionary provisions of I.R.E. 615 and, second, because there was no
showing of potential (or actual) prejudice arising from her presence in the
courtroom.
First, the witness was a victim by law and therefore exempt from exclusion
under I.R.E. 615. A “crime victim, as defined by statute” has the right to “be
present at all criminal justice proceedings.” Idaho Const., Art. I, § 22.

The

statutory definition of crime victim includes “immediate families of victims of such
youthful age or incapacity as precludes them from exercising these rights
personally.” I.C. § 19-5306(3). Furthermore, even though inability of the victim
to exercise the right to be present personally renders all immediate family
members “victims,” the statute gives the court discretion to “designate a
representative from the immediate family to exercise these rights on behalf of a
… minor victim.” Id. The prosecutor represented that the victim, a minor, would
not be present in the courtroom during the trial (except when testifying) and that

5

he was very emotional about the proceedings. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 261, L. 23 – p.
262, L. 12; p. 263, Ls. 11-15.) The district court allowed the mother to remain in
the courtroom during the trial as the family representative, and thus the victim.
(Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 263, Ls. 16-25.1)
On appeal Collom initially points out that before immediate family
members could be considered victims in this case, the court must “determine
whether or not the alleged victim is of ‘such youthful age or incapacity as [to]
preclude them from exercising [his] rights personally.’” (Appellant’s brief, p. 9.)
However, he presents no argument claiming, much less establishing, that the
district court erred in this determination.
Collom next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by
designating the mother, as opposed to the father, as the family representative.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-10.) The only reason he puts forth in support of that
assertion, however, is that the “State did not present any reason why the alleged
victim’s father, Marshall Winder, could not have been in the courtroom during the
testimony of EO, instead of Monica Winder, as requested by the defendant.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-10.2) Collom fails to comprehend that it is his burden of

Because the parties and the district court spent considerable time on the
question of whether the mother was a “victim” as defined by the statute (Trial Tr.,
vol. I, p. 256, L. 9 – p. 263, L. 25), Collom’s claim that “[n]o inquiry was made to
determine whether Monica Winder was a victim” (Appellant’s brief, p. 2) is false.
1

Appellate counsel’s claim that the defense “requested” that the victim’s mother
not be “in the courtroom during the testimony of EO” (Appellant’s brief, p. 9; see
also p. 2) is at best misleading. Although the defense moved to exclude
witnesses prior to trial, including Monica Winder, at no time did the defense relate
that specifically to E.O. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 256, L. 24 – p. 257, L. 10.) The
defense made no specific objection to Ms. Winder being present in the courtroom
2
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establishing an abuse of discretion. The district court concluded there was no
sufficient reason for rejecting the family’s choice of representative, and exercised
its discretion in allowing the family’s chosen representative to be present. (Trial
Tr., vol. I, p. 262, L. 18 – p. 263, L. 25.) Although the court in its discretion could
have designated the father instead of the mother does not make the appointment
of the mother beyond the discretion of the court. Because Collom has failed to
present any legal basis for why appointment of the mother was outside the
boundaries of the court’s discretion, he has failed to show an abuse of that
discretion.
He has also failed to show an abuse of discretion because he never,
before the trial court or on appeal, claimed or established any relevant prejudice.
As stated above, “the trial court ordinarily should not exclude witnesses without a
demonstration of probable prejudice” and the prejudice at issue is the “possibility
of witnesses shaping their testimony to conform to or rebut the prior testimony of
other witnesses.” Huntsman, 146 Idaho at 589, 199 P.3d at 164. Thus, to show
an abuse of discretion in refusing to exclude a potential witness the appellant

during E.O.’s testimony. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 504, L. 1 – p. 511, L. 1.) Even if the
pretrial motion to exclude had been granted, Ms. Winder would have been
allowed in the courtroom when E.O. testified. Ms. Winder testified in the state’s
case-in-chief. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 388, L. 13 – p. 414, L. 8.) She was re-called
and testified for the defense prior to E.O. testifying. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 495, L. 2
– p. 499, L. 19 (Monica Winder testified as defense witness); p. 511, Ls. 5-7
(E.O. called and sworn as witness).) Because her testimony was completed
before E.O. testified, even granting the pretrial motion excluding witnesses would
not have prevented her from sitting in the courtroom after having given her
testimony. Any claim that the defense raised any objection to Ms. Winder being
in the courtroom while E.O. testified based on the pre-trial contact between the
two is false.
7

must show the “possibility of witnesses shaping their testimony to conform to or
rebut the prior testimony of other witnesses.” Id. Monica Winder testified after
the victim, J.W., in the state’s case-in-chief, and again when called by the
defense, after several defense witnesses. (See Trial Tr., vol. I, pp. 5-6.) Collom
has not argued that there was any genuine risk that Monica Winder shaped her
testimony to conform to the victim’s testimony because she was in the courtroom
when he testified, and of course the defense had control over the order in which
it called its own witnesses, suggesting it was not concerned that Monica Winder
would shape her testimony because of hearing the testimony of the preceding
defense witnesses. In short, Collom has utterly failed to address the only legal
basis upon which he may claim an abuse of discretion.
Finally, for similar reasons any error in not excluding Monica Winder from
the courtroom except when she testified was harmless. Idaho Criminal Rule 52
provides that “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect
substantial rights shall be disregarded.” I.C.R. 52. “To establish harmless error,
the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did
not contribute to the verdict obtained.” State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 140, 334
P.3d 806, 814 (2014).
Only one witness for the state preceded Monica’s testimony, the victim.
(Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 5.) The victim was Monica’s son, and he resided in her home.
(Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 389, Ls. 3-23.) Collom’s counsel had the opportunity to
explore through cross-examination Monica’s relationship with her son and
whether that affected her testimony.

The possibility that she altered her
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testimony because she was present when her son testified, is so small as to be
non-existent. If there had been any shaping of testimony, such had already
occurred before trial and was subject to cross-examination.

Any abuse of

discretion in allowing Monica Winder to be in the courtroom when the victim
testified was, beyond a reasonable doubt, harmless.
In addition, when Monica Winder was called as a defense witness she
was questioned about her confront telephone call with Collom. (Trial Tr., vol. II,
p. 495, L. 2 – p. 498, L. 23.) This was a topic not covered with any other witness.
(See, generally, Trial Tr.) Because there was no other testimony about the topic,
by definition her presence in the courtroom could not have caused her to alter
her testimony. Any error was therefore harmless.
Rule 615, which allows the court to excuse witnesses, excludes victims
from its scope.

Collom has failed to show that the trial court erred when it

concluded that Monica Winder, the mother of the victim, was a “victim” pursuant
to the statute based on her son’s age and emotional state during trial.

In

addition, a court abuses its discretion in refusing to exclude witnesses only where
there is a showing of prejudice arising from the possibility of witnesses shaping
their testimony to conform to or rebut the prior testimony of other witnesses.
Collom has never claimed, much less shown, such prejudice. He has, for both
these reasons, failed to show an abuse of discretion in the district court’s ruling
on his pre-trial motion to exclude witnesses.
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II.
Collom Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion For New Trial
A.

Introduction
Collom moved for a new trial asserting, among other grounds, that

defense witness E.O. had been intimidated by Monica Winder’s presence in the
courtroom. (R., pp. 266, 275-82.) The district court denied the motion on the
grounds that it failed to articulate a statutorily allowed basis for granting a new
trial. (R., pp. 298-303.) On appeal Collom asserts that the district court erred,
but fails to even address the basis for the district court’s holding. (Appellant’s
brief, pp. 6-10.)
B.

Standard Of Review
The ruling on a motion for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. State v. Cantu, 129 Idaho 673, 674, 931 P.2d 1191, 1192 (1997);
State v. Howell, 137 Idaho 817, 819, 54 P.3d 460, 462 (Ct. App. 2002). “The trial
judge does not abuse his or her discretion unless a new trial is granted for a
reason that is not delineated in the code or unless the decision to grant or deny a
new trial is manifestly contrary to the interest of justice.” State v. Davis, 127
Idaho 62, 65, 896 P.2d 970, 973 (1995).
C.

The District Court’s Determination That Collom Did Not Allege A Statutory
Ground For A New Trial Is Uncontested On Appeal
The only grounds for granting a new trial are found in I.C. § 19-2406.

State v. Cantu, 129 Idaho 673, 675, 931 P.2d 1191, 1193 (1997). The Idaho
Criminal Rules provide that a new trial may be granted if required by “the interest
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of justice.” I.C.R. 34. “Rule 34 does not create additional grounds for granting a
new trial but, rather, provides the standard for determining whether a new trial
should be granted when one or more of the statutory bases are present.” Howell,
137 Idaho at 819, 54 P.3d at 462. Therefore, I.C. § 19-2406 “limits the instances
in which the trial court’s discretion may be exercised.” Cantu, 129 Idaho at 675,
931 P.2d at 1193 (trial court abused discretion by granting new trial on grounds
of ineffective assistance of counsel, which is not ground provided by I.C. § 192406). See also State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 83, 86, 878 P.2d 782, 785 (1994).
The district court concluded that in-court witness intimidation claims are
not grounds under the statute to move for a new trial. (R., pp. 298-303.) Collom
does not claim that his witness intimidation claim is within the scope of the
statute. (See Appellant’s brief.) Because Collom has failed to even articulate a
theory of error, he has failed to show an abuse of discretion in the denial of the
motion for a new trial. See State v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 366-67, 956 P.2d
1311, 1313-14 (Ct. App. 1998) (appellate court will affirm trial court on
unchallenged basis for ruling); State v. Bjorkland, 126 Idaho 656, 659, 889 P.2d
90, 93 (Ct. App. 1994) (orders by trial court presumed correct “absent a clear
showing by the appellant of error”).
III.
Collom Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Prosecutor’s Closing
Arguments
A.

Introduction
During closing argument, the prosecutor compared the defense strategy to

a squid shooting ink to obfuscate what was important or employing “razzle11

dazzle” to divert the jury from the truth. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 566, L. 4 – p. 567, L.
17.) The defense did not object to these arguments. (Id.) In discussing the
testimony of witness E.O. the prosecutor mentioned that “she had to leave a test
at school to come over here.”

(Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 564, Ls. 16-20.)

Again,

defense counsel did not object. (Id.) In addition, and again without objection, the
prosecutor discussed testimony regarding whether the victim was a “bad
employee,” stating that even if he was that did not give anyone the right to
victimize him. (Trial Tr., p. 559, Ls. 4-14.)
On appeal, Collom asserts that the prosecutor’s arguments amount to
fundamental error, but fails to even apply the relevant fundamental error
standard. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-12.) Analysis of Collom’s claim shows it fails
on every prong of the fundamental error test.
B.

Standard Of Review
“[T]he standard of review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct

depends on whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at trial.” State v.
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715, 215 P.3d 414, 435 (2009). If a defendant fails to
timely object at trial to allegedly improper closing arguments by the prosecutor,
the conviction will be set aside for prosecutorial misconduct only upon a showing
by the defendant that the alleged misconduct rises to the level of fundamental
error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010).
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C.

Collom Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Prosecutor’s
Closing Arguments
Claims of error not preserved by timely objection are reviewed using a

three-part test:
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the
defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error
affected the defendant’s substantial rights, meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings.
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Application of this test shows no
fundamental error.
First, Collom has failed to show that the prosecutor’s arguments
constituted constitutional error.

It is improper to disparage defense counsel.

State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 19, 189 P.3d 477, 481 (Ct. App. 2008). However,
comments that characterize defense arguments and theories, but are not
directed at defense counsel, are not improper. State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176,
189, 254 P.3d 77, 90 (Ct. App. 2011). Thus, arguing that defense arguments are
“red herrings and smoke and mirrors” is not improper. Id. at 188-89, 254 P.3d at
89-90.

The prosecutor’s arguments comparing defense evidence to an

obscuring ink cloud or “razzle-dazzle” diverting from the truth was not improper.
Likewise, mentioning that E.O. had to leave a test to come to court was
not improper, much less constitutional error. Defense counsel had previously
represented to the court, in the presence of the jury, that E.O had been taken
from a test at school in order to testify.
13

(Trial Tr., vo. II, p. 494, Ls. 7-17.)

Collom’s claimed fundamental error looks more like a stipulation than an
improper argument.
Finally, the prosecutor’s argument about whether the victim was a “bad
employee” was merely a discussion of the evidence, and the prosecutor’s main
point was that it really did not matter because it is just as illegal to victimize bad
employees as good ones. This was not a constitutionally prohibited argument.
State v. Mendoza, 151 Idaho 623, 626, 262 P.3d 266, 269 (Ct. App. 2011)
(prosecutor “entitled to discuss fully … the evidence and the inferences to be
drawn therefrom”). None of the arguments by the prosecutor have been shown
to be objectionable, much less constitutional error.
Even if the arguments were debatably objectionable, Collom has not
shown that it rises to the level of a constitutionally objectionable argument. Not
all claims that an argument is improper rise to the level of asserting a
constitutional violation. State v. Beeks, 159 Idaho 223, ___, 358 P.3d 784, 791
(Ct. App. 2015) (merely claiming the error implicates due process does not make
the error of constitutional dimension).

Collom has failed to show that any

allegedly erroneous closing argument rose to the level of being barred by the
constitution.
Moreover, the record shows that counsel made a tactical decision to not
object, which disqualifies the argument that the error was fundamental under the
second prong of that test. In the defense closing argument counsel addressed
the “ink” and “razzle-dazzle” arguments specifically. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 579, L.
12 – p. 580, L. 9.) Having made the tactical decision to address the prosecutor’s
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arguments through argument rather than objection, Collom cannot for the first
time on appeal claim fundamental error.
Likewise, the prosecutor’s mention that witness E.O. had come directly
from being in a test was not objectionable because defense counsel made the
same representation to the court in the presence of the jury. Finally, it was
eminently reasonable for trial counsel to express no objection to the prosecutor’s
discussion of whether the evidence established the victim was a “bad employee,”
especially where that point was secondary to the prosecutor’s primary line of
argument regarding that evidence. Nothing in this record indicates that defense
counsel did not affirmatively choose to not object, because reasons to not object
are plain in the record.
Finally, Collom has failed to show prejudice. Although long on hyperbole
and wild extrapolation of what meaning the jury would have gleaned from the
“ink” and “razzle-dazzle” arguments, Collom’s argument is short on references to
the record or analysis of why the argument was actually prejudicial or why
defense counsel’s counter-argument was ineffective. He merely engages in wild
extrapolation of the worst possible reading of the prosecutor’s argument rather
than addressing what the prosecutor actually said. It is well established that “a
court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to
have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy
exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging
interpretations.” Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47 (1974). The
prosecutor’s argument that the defense evidence was more obscuring “ink” or
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attention diverting “razzle-dazzle” than substantive and weighty was not improper
or prejudicial unless given a much more dark and sinister meaning than is
allowed by this general principle.
Likewise, the mention that E.O. was taken away from a test cannot be
deemed prejudicial in the face of the record showing that the jury was already
aware of that fact because Collom’s trial counsel represented the same thing in
open court.
Finally, the argument that the victim “wasn’t a bad employee” came with
the caveat that he “wasn’t a very good employee” and was part of the broader
argument that whether he was a bad employee does not bear much probative
value as to whether he was sexually touched by Collom. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 559,
Ls. 4-14.)

There is no reason to believe this argument unfairly prejudiced

Collom.
Collom bears the burden of showing constitutional error; that the error is
plain on the record and not the result of a tactical decision to not object; and that
the error “affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.” Perry, 150 Idaho at
226, 245 P.3d at 978. He has failed to meet this burden as to any of the three
prongs of the fundamental error standard.
IV.
Collom Has Failed To Show The Cumulative Error Standard Applies
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of trial errors, harmless in
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.

State v.

Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate
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to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding of more than one error.
State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). In addition,
cumulative error analysis does not include errors not objected to unless those
errors are found to be fundamental. Perry, 150 Idaho at 230, 245 P.3d at 982.
As set forth above, Collom has failed to show error or fundamental error. There
are, therefore, no errors to cumulate.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s
judgment of conviction.
DATED this 8th day of April, 2016.

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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